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4Preface
Under the multilateral trade system governed by the GATT/WTO, the existence
of regional economic cooperation covered by regional trade agreements (RTAs)
is allowed. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the number of RTAs concluded by the
contracting parties of GATT 1947 increased gradually. However, since the
beginning of the 1990s, the number of RTAs has been proliferating so rapidly that
it forms a so-called surge of RTAs.
Obviously, the surge has flowed to East Asia in recent years and further, both
before and after Mainland China and Taiwan entered into the World Trade
Organisation last year, the surge was reinforced in a network of many activities
relating to the possible conclusion or strengthening of RTAs. In particular, it
seems that Mainland China has a special interest in these activities. Nevertheless,
these activities might be somewhat less than optimal. In my opinion, there is a
need to make a comparison between the background of the European Union and
the present situation in East Asia. An objective analysis could be helpful in
establishing a more healthily cooperation within the territory of East Asia.
In preparing my work, I feel greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor Hans-
Heinrich Vogel. His so kindly and meticulous instruction gave me a very extensive
training that I could not have obtained by myself. I am sure what I have learned
from him will promote my future career.
Special thanks should go to Professor Hans Henrik Lidgard. His concern and
suggestions did help me a lot in gaining a better understanding of what to do and
how to do it.
I would like to present thanks to Mr. Philip Horowitz, who has kindly assisted in
the editing of my work.
Thanks should also go to Ms. Johanna Stier. She has always sent her warmly
encouragement when I met with any difficulty.
Finally, I wish thank all the supportive staff at Department of Political Science and
Faculty of Law for providing me with a chance to study in Lund University, a so
nice place full of classical culture and academic atmosphere.
5Abbreviations
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AICO ASEAN Industrial Co-operation
AIA ASEAN Investment Area
APEC Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBERA Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
CEE Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
CRTA Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (WTO)
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DSB Dispute Settlement Body (WTO)
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EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus
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FTA free trade agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
IMF International Monetary Fund
MFN (General) Most-Favoured-Nation (Treatment)
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
PTA Preferential Trading Agreements (East Asia)
Quad EU, US, Japan, and Canada
RTA regional trade agreement
SAT substantially all the trade (GATT XXIV)
SEZs special economic zones (Mainland China)
TEU Treaty on European Union
TPRM Trade Policy Review Mechanism (WTO)
USD US Dollar
WTO World Trade Organisation
61 Introduction
Since the Customs Union was formed in Western Europe in 1968, there has been
a considerable stream of regional alliances emerging in different regions in the
world. Rather than taking the form of customs unions, most of the countries within
the regions concerns chose the free trade area as the form for their co-operation.1
Among a number of examples, the most notable one could be the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was established in 1994.
Parallel to the multilateral trade liberalisation process, this stream evolved so
rapidly that until the 1990s it formed a so-called surge. Now, it seems that East
Asian countries are the chief followers of this surge and the Mainland of China,
after its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) looks like being an
especially active one.
Generally, the customs union or the free trade area covered by a regional trade
agreement (RTA) is characterised by its intra-union preferential treatment regime
where the main instrument is the reciprocal tariff deductions between the member
states. This means that those countries outside the agreement can not enjoy the
benefits. Examining the economics behind the surge, one sees the phenomenon
which was originally illustrated by Viner’s (1950) theory, showing that where one
has a customs union, intra-union benefits are attainable. 2
However, according to Viner’s model, such benefits can also be obtained under
the multilateral trade regime. Why then are those countries still pursuing the free
trade area regime even though they are also within the regime of multilateral
trade? The following background considerations could be advanced to help
interpret the phenomenon.
Common Reasons for the Members and Candidates of the free trade area.
First, under the General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment laid down in Article 1
of General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), any favour granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties. In other words, if a favour granted was not given to
all the other parties, this will constitute discrimination. Under a free trade
agreement, the tariff within the area is lower than that within the multilateral trade
regime. And such a measure, without considering other provisions of GATT,
indeed breaches Article I. However, based on the view that the free trade area
serves to foster the process of multilateral trade liberalisation, both GATT 1947
                                                
1 Robert Bejesky, Lecture on International Trade at Thomas M. Cooley Law School (Jan. 22,
2000).
2 Stephen P. Magee, Hak - Loh Lee, Endogenous tariff creation and tariff diversion in a
customs union, European Economic Review45 (2001) p496.
7and GATT 1994 in the framework of World Trade Organisation, allow the
existence and development of free trade areas as an exception to Article I of
GATT3.
Second, the World Trade Organisation regime is deemed problematic because
there exists unequal representation, inequity of rules and weak institutional
capacity in enforceability and dispute resolution. Considering these elements,
some countries lack confidence in the regime of the World Trade Organisation. In
contrast, within a framework set up by free trade area, the problems are expected
to be resolved effectively.
Third, besides the positive aspects of the free trade area, the free trade area itself
is seen as an ideal tool for protectionism. But to offset any negative effects, other
countries want to have their own!
Individual Reasons in East Asia
After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the fact that the US left the IMF to deal
with the crisis while the latter imposed a stringent conditional loan package on the
recipients served to wake up these countries. As similar institutional problems to
those of the World Trade Organisation existed in the Asian Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC), they did not want to resort to its regime to seek for
safeguards. Instead, they tried to construct their own new regime to safeguard the
health of their economy. Another reason particularly concerns Taiwan: after
Mainland China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation, those fearing the
Mainland’s threat are engaged in concluding free trade areas.
Specific Points relating to Mainland China
Mainland China itself has both advocated the China Free Trade Area in which
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are included, while, at the same time, promoting
ASEAN plus three negotiations where Mainland China is included but Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan are excluded. The context of this position could be the
result of reasoning using Viner’s model, which indicates that the more free trade
areas a country participates in, the more benefits it can obtain. The most
persuasive examples in this respect could be the European Union and the United
States: the former has concluded more than twenty free trade agreements while
the latter enjoys at least seven.
Nevertheless, although we can say that the East Asia region has rather good
grounds for establishing its own free trade area - and there indeed exists a basis
on which the co-operation can rest - the very diversity within this territory will be
an obstacle in the way. Reviewing the elements which led to a successful EU, and
examining the special situation in this area, the beneficial extent of co-operation
planned for the Asian free trade area would be better understood.
                                                
3  General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) XXIV.
http://www.wto.org.com (viewed March 3, 2002).
82 Economic dynamics behind
the free trade areas
2.1 The original free trade areas and the allure
of the benefits of a free trade area
The original regional trade alliance can be traced back to the “uniform duties” set
up from 1664 to 1667 in Northern France, but one of the earliest “free trade
areas” bearing the essential features of contemporary RTAs is the German
Zollverein, formed among eighteen small states in 1834, and functioning “as an
important catalyst for a united Germany later in the century”.4 Nonetheless, these
practices were not the subject of theoretical discussion.
The classical theory in this field could be Viner’s (1950) model describing two
directions of international trade following the formation of a free trade union, i.e.
trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation implies increasing welfare
within the territory of the union, because intra-union trade expands with the
abolition of tariffs on imports from member states. So import costs will decrease
as a result of the tariff deduction and therefore, importing firms will prefer to look
within the union for their new partners. On the other hand, trade diversion means
that, as importing firms within the union favor partners who are themselves in the
union, the welfare of former external partners will decrease as they lose their
opportunities even if they offer lower prices5.
After Viner’s theory, Goto-Hamada (1995)6 further elaborated a theory of the
Symmetric Tariff Bloc Model. This model covering four assumed symmetrical
countries or four symmetrical groups of countries and demonstrates explicitally by
three stages the situation before and after the formation of the union.  In the first
stage, the situation before the formation of the union is taken into account, where
the four countries engage in trade with each other, and all imported products are
subject to the same tariff rate. The second stage indicates when the formation of
the union is initiated. In this context, country 1 and country 2 formed a union in
which the tariffs dropped to zero on trade between the two countries. In contrast,
the other two countries, namely country 3 and country 4 are outside the union and
they are also independent of each other. Therefore, the trade of country 3 and 4
with the union countries as well as their trade between themselves are still subject
to the original tariff rate. The third stage explains the likelihood of alliance between
country 3 and country 4. During this stage, as country 3 and country 4 are worse
                                                
4 Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System 1, 1997.
5 See supra note 2.
6 Junichi Goto Koichi Hamada, EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses: a Perspective from the
Calculus of Participation, NEBER working paper series, October 1995.
9off after the formation of the union between country 1 and country 2, there
emerges an incentive between country 3 and country 4 to form another union to
counter the first one. Thus the relationship among four separate countries
becomes a relationship between the two parallel unions. In this situation, country
1 and country 2 form a union while country 3 and 4 form a second one. Trade
within the territory of each individual union is subject to zero tariffs while trade
between the two unions is subject to the same common external tariffs.  For all
this, see Figure I below.
Apparently, here the driving forces pushing countries to enter into a free trade
area have two aspects: seeking their own welfare and escaping losses arising from
trade diversion.
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Stage I: no union exists
Stage II: first union
Stage III: second union following
Figure I: process of union formation
Lured by the possibility of benefits, the countries seeking an alliance will compete
by way of concluding or entering more free trade areas than others, since the
more free trade areas an body is involved in, the more welfare it can get while less
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trade diversion will occur. As each of them attempts to benefit to the greatest
extent possible, the process of the formation of the union becomes more like the
pattern given in Figure II. From this figure, we can see that A3 occupies a most
advantageous position as a result of its greater number of free trade areas
partners than do all the others. Relying on its position, A3 gains preferential
treatments from B3, C3, A1 and A2 but these four can not do the same thing.
Accordingly, we can say, just these elements constitute the original dynamics to
the development of the free trade areas.
1. Assuming A1 = A2 = A3 = B1 = B2 = B3 = C1 = C2 = C3
2. When A3 + B3,
· they are on an equal level;
· but they each are in a more advantageous position than the others;
3. If A3 wants to be the first, it can invite C3. Then B3 and C3 are at equal
level, and A3 is number 1.
Figure II: dynamics pushing countries to aim to the centre
2.2 Actions seeking enhanced welfare
2.2.1 Various forms of cooperation under free trade
12
agreements
Although increased benefits are in general a strong inducement, restrictions
imposed by existing conditions mean that the individual forms of regional co-
operation are different. In accordance with the extent of the economic integration
that the agreements cover, they can be roughly classified as follows:
Free trade area
A preferential arrangement where the tariff rates among member states are lower
than those between member states and non-member states while the external tariff
is charged at different rates determined independently by the member states.
Usually the free trade agreement has the aim of totally eliminating customs
duties and restrictions among those members.
Customs union
This kind of arrangement introduces a common customs tariff which permits zero
duty among member states on imports of goods and services while imposing a
common external tariff. In a customs union, the member states no longer have the
power to change tariffs separately.
Common market
Within the territory of the common market, besides the common customs tariff,
there is also a common commercial policy covering the free mobility of production
factors including services, persons and investment.
Single market
Under this kind of arrangement, besides the elements of the common market, all
producers and consumers are covered by common rules, meaning that the
different geographic parts within the market cannot erect barriers preventing
participants of other members from operating.
Economic union
The economic union is a sort of single market where even closer co-operation has
materialised; namely, the member states have a common economic and currency
policy through co-ordination.
2.2.2 Two models: European Union & North American
Free Trade Agreement
2.2.2.1 European Union
West Europe has experienced almost all the above forms of co-operation. After
the Second World War, the lasting hope for a unified Europe was strengthened
and evolved into a kind of general political aspiration. Based on the consensus
that close economic relationship among the states would provide the basis on
which real and continuing peace could rest, the Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was concluded in 1951. Following that, in
1957 two treaties signed in Rome established the European Atomic Energy
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Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). These
agreements then covered six states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In 1967, the Merger Treaty provided that the
four institutions created by the ECSC Treaty serve the European Communities
jointly. Until then, the preferential tariff arrangement had been in force between
the EEC members but competence in introducing external tariffs still remained in
the hands of each member. So, during this period, the EEC was at the stage of
free trade agreement.
As Council Regulation 950/687 entered into force in 1969, the Common Customs
Union was formed. All customs duties among the six founding member States of
the Community were eliminated and a common external customs tariff was
introduced. After the formation of the Customs Union, the Single European Act of
1987 successfully ensured the completion of the single, internal market by the end
of 1992. The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), which entered into
force on November 1, 1993, formed the European Union and provided for “
economic, monetary, and political union.” In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was
signed, which were a completion of the final preparations for the third stage of
economic and monetary union and the introduction of the euro, and the
establishment of a new all-Union strategy on employment. It has thus gone
through the 4 remaining stages described above.
2.2.2.2 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Looking back on the specific impulses promoting the formation of NAFTA, one
element could be the fact that the GATT was not sufficient to satisfy the free trade
needs within the territory of North America. It is known that the GATT 1947 did
not mandate free trade, but encouraged member states to enter into agreements
to reduce trade barriers either through a common market or a free trade zone.
However, the situation in North America, especially that between Canada and the
United States went beyond what the GATT could cover. The two countries were
ready and wanted to establish a union leading to a freer trade union with zero
tariffs before further fostering the free exchange of capital and labour between
them. Moreover, it was evident that the very stable and successful integration
example of the European Community inspired Canada and the United States and
drew them to negotiate about a free trade zone for North America. As a first
significant step, in the 1980s, the United States and Canada negotiated a trade
arrangement to reduce trade barriers between the two countries. Consequently,
both countries signed the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CUSTA) in 1988. In June 1990, Mexico entered into negotiations to establish a
trilateral free trade agreement with the United States and Canada.  The formal
negotiations for a free trade agreement began in February 1991. These
                                                
7 O.J.L 172/1, 1968.
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negotiations led to the establishment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement that entered into force on January 1, 1994. NAFTA is designed to
eliminate all trade barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico and
create the largest “totally free” trade zone in the world.
2.2.3 Impact of the European Union and North
American Free Trade Agreement
2.2.3.1 Trade creation within the European Union and North
American Free Trade Agreement
European Union
After the abolition of internal tariffs leading to market optimism, the newly created
trade opportunities gave a boost to trade growth between Member States in the
Community.8
In this respect, the early benefits of the original six EEC Members could be very
persuasive. According to Michael Davenport’s analysis, if the net gain of trade
creation is taken as trade creation less trade distortion, “the average net gain of
trade creation for the studies showing a net gain was almost 9 billion USD” which
amounts to “nearly 2 percent of Community GDP” 9. It is further indicated that
within the European Union, “ the incumbent bloc countries’ share of the joining
country’s trade typically rose by eighteen percentage points…”10
Specifically, after the formation of the Single Market, there has been a major
expansion of EU import share with very little gain by non-EU producers. Further,
competitiveness has also been improved: on average, price-cost margins have
fallen by an average of 3.9 percent since 1991 across the fifteen countries
studied.11
North American Free Trade Agreement
From 1980 to 1990, the period before the formation of the NAFTA, US exports
to Mexico remained around 7.0 percent of all U.S. exports. In contrast they
amounted to 11.6 percent of U.S. exports in l998, the fourth year after NAFTA’s
                                                
8http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/publications/brochures/move/douane/customs/txt_en.html
#1 (viewed April 23, 2002).
9 Timothy Lyons, EC Customs Law, 2001, P.4 -5.
10 Caroline L. Freund and John McLaren, On the Dynamics of Trade Diversion: Evidence
From Four Trade Blocs. http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/1999/637/ifdp637.pdf
(viewed May 10 2002).
11 http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/studies/stud12.htm (viewed May 10, 2002.).
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entering into force. Meanwhile, imports from Mexico illustrated a similar pattern.
On to the side of Mexico, its share of U.S. imports doubled from l980 to l998.
From l993, the share of the U.S. market had increased in great deal.12
It is notable that, since January 1, 1994, United States total trade (imports and
exports combined) with Canada and Mexico has increased from an annual
average of $269 billion in 1991 to 1993 to an annual average of $384 billion in
1994 to 1996.
As for NAFTA intra-trade, in 1997, it accounted for 49 percent of all trade by its
members, an increase of almost 11 percent a year on average since 1990. At the
same time, NAFTA trade to third countries was only growing at 7 percent.
2.2.3.2 Trade diversion outside the European Union and North
American Free Trade Area
European Union
It has been alleged that the Single Market has been trade creating, both for EU
and non-EU producers. And, there “is little evidence of any substantial trade
diversion of non-EU trade”.13 But still, some trade diversion stemming from the
creation of EU can be seen by way of two examples: Central and Eastern
Europe(CEE) and Latin America.
In the socialist era, confronting high tariffs, quantitative restrictions and a wide
range of other protection measures, CEE sustained seriously trade diversion in
accessing the EU market. One reason for this is that, at that time, CEE ranked at
the bottom of the pyramid of trade preferences granted by the EU to various
groups of countries. After the EU concluded a trade and co-operation agreement
with Hungary in 1988 and even more so, after the promotion of the 1991
“Europe Agreements” providing further preferential arrangements, Hungary and
Poland rose to the top of the pyramid of trade preferences. Gradually, trade
diversion has been changed to trade creation. From 1988 to 1998, EU imports
from a group of seven CEE countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic) increased fourfold. In contrast,
during the same period, EU imports from Latin America just doubled. In 1998,
the EU imported 64 percent more from these seven CEE than from all Latin
American countries together.14 Compared with CEE, Latin America suffered a
larger extent of trade diversion.
Now EU, where Mainland China is currently the second largest supplier of textile,
is entering into talks with Latin America for a free trade area to be establish in
                                                
12 Anne O. Krueger, Trade Creation and Trade Diversion under NAFTA , Working Paper
7429. http://www.nber.org/papers/w7429m (viewed May 10, 2002).
13 http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/studies/stud12.htm (viewed May 10, 2002.).
14 http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/briefings/37a2_en.htm#3 (viewed April 23, 2002).
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2005, meaning the Mainland may well lose a significant share of the relevant
market15.
North American Free Trade Area
Regarding trade diversion resulting from NAFTA, trade volume to the third
countries to third countries varies a lot. Its neighbours, Central America and the
Caribbean, with a large amount of trade potentially directed at the United States,
have experienced significant economic downturns recently because of their
inability to compete with Mexico16. In this regard, the World Bank has estimated
that up to 36 percent of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)
country exports to the United States could be displaced with countries such as St.
Lucia facing displacement of 79 percent.
As has been indicated, from 1995 to 1999 Japan, Korea and Mainland China
exports to the US declined 2.2 percent while Taiwanese export to the US
declined 0.46 percent within this period.17 Moreover, Mexico has now displaced
Mainland China, the former largest suppliers of textiles to the US.
                                                
15 Jianming Xu, Intonation Trade Issues (Chinese Version) 1, 2002.
16 David A. Gantz, The United States and the Expansion of Western Hemisphere Free
Trade: Participant or Observer?, 14 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 381, 382, 409 (1997).
17 http://www.cetra.org.tw/mars/mkrpt/891206.htm (April 20, 2002).
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3 The proliferating free trade
areas under the regime of
World Trade Organisation
Envying the welfare created and fearing the distortions of the consequent trade
diversion, free trade areas have been gradually proliferating since the 1950’s.
However, as can be seen from Figure III, the amount of free trade areas
increased so rapidly after the creation of EU that this formed the so-called surge
of free trade areas.
According to the World Trade Organisation’s statistics in 2000, the “number of
RTAs in which at least one World Trade Organisation member participates has
roughly doubled in less than ten years”,18 and up to January 2002, there have
been 162 notified RTAs19.
Figure III: RTAs notified to World Trade Organisation20
Currently, more and more people regard the very surge as indicating a lack of
overall legal discipline and worry that it will undermine the Multilateral Trading
System. Their fears concern not only the effectiveness of the concrete provisions
which legitimate free trade areas, but also on the credibility of the World Trade
Organisation regime as a whole.
                                                
18 Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/37, 2
March 2000, (00-0789).
19 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm    (April 20, 2002).
20 Id.
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3.1 Relevant Provisions Legitimating free trade
areas under the World Trade Organisation
regime
From GATT 1947 to the World Trade Organisation, free trade agreements have
always constituted a lawful exception to the General Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment.  This positive attitude is formulated in different legislation as following:
Article XXIV of GATT 1947, 1974 Decision on Differential and more
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries (Enabling Clause), Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter, the
Understanding) and Article V of General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).
In 1996, the World Trade Organisation Membership further confirmed its stance
on Regional Trade Agreements in Singapore Ministerial Declaration as follows:
“We note that trade relations of WTO Members are being increasingly influenced
by regional trade agreements, which have expanded vastly in number, scope and
coverage. Such initiatives can promote further liberalisation and may assist least-
developed, developing and transition economies in integrating into the international
trading system. In this context, we note the importance of existing regional
arrangements involving developing and least-developed countries. The expansion
and extent of regional trade agreements make it important to analyse whether the
system of WTO rights and obligations as it relates to regional trade agreements
needs to be further clarified. We reaffirm the primacy of the multilateral trading
system, which includes a framework for the development of regional trade
agreements, and we renew our commitment to ensure that regional trade
agreements are complementary to it and consistent with its rules. In this regard, we
welcome the establishment and endorse the work of the new Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements. We shall continue to work through progressive
liberalisation in the WTO as we are committed in the WTO Agreement and
Decisions adopted at Marrakesh, and in so doing facilitate mutually supportive
processes of global and regional trade liberalisation.”
Further, in 1996, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) was
established. The CRTA is in charge of examining the applications regarding free
trade areas proposed by contracting parties and, by referring to its standard
model, making an assessment of the likely impact on the multilateral trade system.
3.1.1 GATT 1947
Definition
19
Under Article XXIV (8) of the GATT, a customs union shall be understood to
mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs
territories, so that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are virtually
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in
products originating in such territories, and, substantially the same duties and other
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the  members of the union to the
trade of territories not included in the union; A free-trade area means a group of
two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
Purposes establishing the customs union and free trade area
Article XXIV (4) of the GATT states that the purpose of a customs union or of a
free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and
not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
Coverage on trade.
GATT requires that the regional trade organisation must cover “substantially all
the trade”, i.e., SAT. GATT XXIV (a) says that either in a customs territory or a
free-trade area, the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce should be
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories of the union. The goal here is to avoid the formation of the regional
blocs where the real point of the union is to arrange preferential treatment on
certain products rather than to practice free trade, solely with a view to preventing
products of third countries access its market.
Interim period
Concerning the situation that the regional trade area needs to be established
gradually, GATT XXIV (5) (c) states that, any interim agreement leading to a
formation of customs union or free trade area, shall include a plan and schedule
for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a
reasonable length of time.
Consequences of the agreements
GATT XXIV (5) requires that, with respect to a free-trade area or an interim
agreement leading to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other
regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and
applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim
agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not
parties to such agreement, shall not be higher or more restrictive than the
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same
constituent territories prior to the  formation of the free-trade area.
Procedure of examination
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GATT XXIV (7) stipulates that a contracting party deciding to enter into a
customs union or free-trade or an interim agreement leading to the formation of
such a union or area, shall promptly notify the Contracting Parties and shall make
available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will
enable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as
they may deem appropriate.
Compensation
GATT 1994 states that, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5 (a), a
contracting party proposing to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the
provisions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In
providing for compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the
compensation already afforded by the reduction brought about in the
corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union.
3.1.2 The Enabling Clause
Under the Enabling Clause, i.e., the 1974 Decision on Differential and more
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, regional trade agreements concluded by developing countries shall be
notified to the Committee on Trade and Development who, after examining it for
consistency, forwards it to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements for its
examination. After that, the latter sends its report to Committee on Trade and
Development for its confirmation.
3.1.3 The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
The Article XXIV Understanding basically purports to strengthen legal discipline
in the proliferation of RTAs. In pursuing this goal, the Article XXIV
Understanding addresses the situation from two angles of approach.
Substantial aspect
First of all, the Understanding is consistent with the building block perspective in
acknowledging the increasing importance of RTAs and their contribution to the
expansion of world trade.
In the main text, the Article XXIV Understanding reemphasizes the importance of
meeting the requirements of paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8. Regarding paragraph 5, it
clarifies that the calculation to assess whether the post-RTA level of tariffs
outweighs pre-RTA ones shall be based upon an overall assessment of weighted
average tariff rates as well as applied (as opposed to bound) tariffs. Also, it
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defines the reasonable length of time as ten years and allows extra time only in
exceptional cases and with a full explanation.
The Article XXIV Understanding also elaborates the rebalancing mechanism for
tariff concessions through the negotiation of mutually satisfactory compensatory
adjustment and modification or withdrawal of pre-existing concessions.
Procedure aspect
In the preamble, the Article XXIV Understanding emphasizes the need for review
of agreements notified under Article XXIV as well as for the transparency of all
Article XXIV agreements. Further, it stipulates a set of mechanisms concerning
monitoring and surveillance. In particular, paragraph 7 requires that a working
party shall recommend a plan and schedule for an interim agreement if these are
not included in the interim agreement itself.  This provision is regarded as a strong
check against the endless delays encountered during the final stages of integration
of some interim agreements.
Finally, paragraph 12 clarifies that the WTO dispute settlement procedure can be
invoked with respect to any issue concerning Article XXIV.
3.1.4 Article V of General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)
Purpose
GATS stipulates that the purpose of regional liberalising trade in services shall be
designed to facilitate trade between the parties to the agreement and shall not in
respect of any Member outside the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to
trade in services. If, a Member herewith intends to withdraw or modify a specific
commitment inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its Schedule, it
shall provide at least 90 days advance notice of such modification or withdrawal
and the procedure set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article XXI shall apply.
Coverage
The “substantial sectoral coverage” laid down in GATS as a condition refers to
the number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to
meet this condition, agreements should not provide for the a priori exclusion of
any mode of supply. Under the coverage, the Members shall remove substantially
all discrimination through elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, either at the entry into force
of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame.
Procedure of examination
GATS stipulates that Members of the regional trade area shall promptly notify any
such agreement and any enlargement or any significant modification of that
agreement to the Council for Trade in Services. They shall also make available to
the Council such relevant information as may be requested by it.  The Council
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may establish a working party to examine such an agreement or enlargement or
modification of that agreement and to report to the Council on its consistency with
this Article.
3.2 Lenient practices under the  above umbrella
From the aforementioned provisions we can see that the authors of the World
Trade Organisation clearly intended to balance the end of promoting free trade
areas and the need to prevent the misuse or even the abuse of the exception.
However, it would be rather difficult to say that the growing surge of the RTAs is
a positive outcome in line with their intentions. What is worse, it is reported that
only one (the Czech Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union) out of more than
one hundred and sixty RTAs has been “confirmed fully compatible” with the
relevant GATT rules21. Discussing the reasons for this, the failure of the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements in prudently verifying the RTAs could
be one cause while the political motivations behind the formation of RTAs often
overwhelm the “economic tests” embedded in Article XXIV. Reviewing the
operation of those provisions, there indeed seem to be deficiencies.
3.2.1 Questionable examples regarding the applications of
GATT XXIV
According to the working party reports dealing with Article XXIV, we can see
the following problems.
Purpose-“not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties”
Paragraph 4 is regarded as the most critical legal text in Article XXIV in defining
the objective of trade regionalism in light of the multilateral trading system.
However, some contract parties, especially giants like the EC and the United
States, used to misinterpret or understate this paragraph in order to justify the
imposition of new trade barriers as a result of the formation or expansion of
RTAs22. For instance, in the context of the accession to the EC where Spain and
Portugal introduced new quantitative restrictions which were suspected of being
inconsistent with Articles XI, XIII, and XXIV, the EC delegations claimed that
paragraph 4 of Article XXIV was only an overall objective which did not impose
                                                
21 See supra  note 18.
22 Working Party on the Free-Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States:
Report of the Working Party adopted on 12 November 1991, L/6927, Nov. 12, 1991, GATT
B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.).
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an obligation on the contract parties23. They further claimed that members of a
RTA could introduce new trade barriers or extend existing barriers to new
members if the net impact of all barriers is less than what had prevailed before the
creation of the RTA. Relying on this ground, the EU even required candidates for
EU membership “to increase tariffs as a condition” for the membership: U.S.
Senator Phil Gramm stated that this condition is a violation of Article XXIV.24
Compensation     
The provision of compensation is stipulated in paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV;
this is understood by EU as stating that the inevitable increase of discriminatory
trade barriers in certain areas, such as agriculture and textiles, could be
compensated for by more generous trade liberalisation in other sectors, such as
manufacturing. This view has been challenged on the ground that the alleged
compensation will not provide for balance. This is because trade diversion
resulting from the expansion of pre-existing trade barriers in such areas as
agriculture and textiles would exact its heaviest toll on the less developed
countries that enjoy a comparative advantage in those sectors.
Coverage of trade-“Substantially all the trade”
We have seen that Article XXIV (8) (b) requires clearly that duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce must be eliminated on substantially all the
trade in products between the constituent territories of the union if it is to be
considered a free trade area. When the Treaty of Paris established the ECSC
which restricted trade liberalisation only to two industries, no one in theory
regarded these two industries as representing “all the trade” and thus being
consistent with Article XXIV. However, “U.S. support for European integration
and the key position of the ECSC Member states in GATT made it unlikely that
the Agreement would be an obstacle to the implementation of the Treaty of
Paris”, so, instead, a compromise was concluded stating  “the ECSC members
were encouraged to adhere to the GATT principles as much as possible and to
remove all obstacles to trade in respect of the products covered ”25. It would be
arguable whether other such RTAs not having the ECSC’s special status would
have the same opportunity.
On the present standard of SAT, according to the Report of the Sub-group of the
Committee on the European Economic Community, the EEC-member countries
proposed that “a free trade area be considered as having been achieved for
substantially all the trade when the volume of liberalised trade reached eighty
                                                
23 Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Communities: Report of the Working
Party adopted on 19-20 October 1988, L/6405, Oct. 19-20, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.)
19, 22 (1989).
24 Daniel S. Potts, Dubious Partnership: the Legal, Political, and Economic Implications of
Adding the United Kingdom to the North American Free Trade Agreement, Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade, Winter 2002.
25 D. Lasok, The Customs Law of the European Economic Community, Second Edition.
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percent of total trade.” However, the report also reveals that many other
members of the sub-group argued that it would be inappropriate and unrealistic to
fix a general percentage of trade that might be applicable to each different case.
To fix a given figure as a criterion for qualification as a RTA is deemed
problematic for many reasons. First of all, the measurement of “liberalised ” trade
volume would hardly be accurate in reality because such measurement is generally
based on prediction of unrealised transactions, such as increased imports resulting
from the formation of a RTA.
Moreover, even if a certain figure, such as eighty percent, were accepted as a
legitimate criterion for endorsing the formation of an RTA, no one could ensure
that “trade restrictive” effects resulting from the non-liberalised or even newly
restricted portion (twenty percent) would be fully offset by the “trade creating”
effect resulting from the portion of liberalised trade (eighty percent). In this regard,
the working party reviewing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
Stockholm Convention noted differing opinions on whether a specific sector, such
as agriculture, might be excluded in assessing substantiality. Some members of the
working party argued that even if ninety percent of trade was covered due to the
creation of a RTA, that fact alone should not allow the exclusion of any specific
sector.  Nevertheless, EFTA members argued that some latitude should be
granted for different products.26
Ultimately, the substantiality test must be conducted on a case-by-case basis.
Considering the inherent textual ambiguity of this test, only jurisprudential
development through accumulation of a sufficient body of case law is likely to
clarify what is substantial in each case.
3.2.2 Case: Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products27
Background
Turkish Quantitative Restrictions (Turkish QRs) was the first case in
GATT/World Trade Organisation history that directly involved Article XXIV. As
a step toward integration into the EC, Turkey followed the EC's lead by
introducing quantitative restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products
from India. India complained that these measures were inconsistent with Articles
XI and XIII.  Turkey tried to justify its measures on the grounds that without
these new quantitative restrictions, the EC would have excluded these products
                                                
26 European Free Trade Association: Examination of Stockholm Convention: Report
adopted on 4 June 1960, L/1235, June 4, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.)  47-58 (1961).
27 Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, Appellate Body Report
adopted November 19, 1999, WT/DS34/AB/R, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/dispu_e/34abr_e.pdf (viewed April, 22, 2002).
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from free trade within the Turkey-EC CU, which would have prevented Turkey
from meeting the requirement of “substantially all trade”.
Decisions28
Examining the Turkish defence, the panel stated that Article XXIV (5) does not
allow parties in a newly formed CU to escape the prohibitions laid down in
Articles XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) and XIII  (Non-
Discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions).  Similarly, regarding
the requirements of paragraph 8, the panel said that the provision does not oblige
Turkey to erect barriers on imports of textiles and clothing that violate other
provisions of the World Trade Organisation Agreement. Thus the Turkish defence
was rejected. However, the panel based its consideration on the so-called
“flexibility” test, saying that the EC and Turkey could have introduced relevant
“administrative means”(system of certificates of origin).
This position was confirmed by the Appellate Body, stating that Turkey could
have adopted a “reasonable alternative” like the “system of certificates of origin”.
Further, the Appellate Body held that, under Article XXIV, it is permitted to
allow the World Trade Organisation system to be harmonised with the
proliferation of RTAs. This position is regarded as opening the way for a new
perspective on trade regionalism.
3.2.3 Other problems
GATS
Like the GATT XXIV, Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) provides for “economic integration.” But also, GATS Article V contains
vague terms such as “substantial sectoral coverage.” What is worse, the problem
is compounded by the fact that GATS Article V has little recourse to a body of
jurisprudence providing interpretative guidelines since the area of trade in services
is still marked by “vast stretches of uncharted territory”, both under the
GATT/World Trade Organisation system and the RTAs.
As for the possibility of adopting GATT/World Trade Organisation jurisprudence
in interpreting Article V, it is regarded as very difficult because, for example,
GATT Article XXIV presupposes legal concepts such as tariffs and RTAs that
have no parallel under GATS. Moreover, the very difference between goods and
services disallows such legal conflation, leading to a more complicated situation.
Surveillance after the formation of RTAs
Although GATT Article XXIV is designed carefully in so far as concerns the
formation of free trade areas, it apparently ignores the situation regarding the
post-formative “operation” of RTAs vis-à-vis other trading units including the
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World Trade Organisation. This limited scope of Article XXIV is quite obvious
either on its own terms or in the context of other World Trade Organisation legal
documents.
All in all two main elements lead to unhealthy regulation of the extension of the
RTAs, i.e., the lack of legal discipline and its inability to address the sophisticated
legal issues pertaining to the operation of RTAs which go beyond its coverage.
3.3 Credibility crisis of the World Trade
Organisation
Indeed those abovementioned problems allow for considerable growth of free
trade areas, which is one of the main reasons for the formation of the surge.
However, if the defective rules could have been applied equally, the surge should
have not been so huge. But, the lack of equity and the weak enforcement regime
within the World Trade Organisation remind us of the need to re-examine the
structure of the World Trade Organisation before analysing any deficiencies.
3.3.1 The Institutional Structure of the World Trade
Organisation
Legitimacy
The legitimacy of the World Trade Organisation is derived from its universal
membership (equal representation) and equal rights and obligations for all
members. The World Trade Organisation embodies a rules-based multilateral
trading system.
At the heart of the multilateral trading system are the World Trade Organisation
agreements, which were developed through a series of negotiation rounds over
the past five decades. These agreements are essentially binding contracts that
govern the general conducts and norms of international business. The goal is to
enable producers, consumers, exporters, importers, and service providers alike to
perform their business functions in a transparent and predictable business
environment.
One of the World Trade Organisation’s most important functions is to serve as a
forum for trade negotiations. The member economies can avoid complicated and
tortuous bilateral negotiations by using the single forum of the World Trade
Organisation to negotiate with all or most of their trading partners. This can help
reduce transaction costs and increase the efficiency of the negotiation procedure.
In principle, all the World Trade Organisation members have equal rights and
obligations. A single set of trade rules applies to all members. The World Trade
Organisation’s rule-making process is all-inclusive. Decisions are made by the
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entire membership, typically by consensus. The World Trade Organisation
agreements are agreed upon by the entire membership and ratified by members’
parliaments. Through this process, a commitment cannot be changed or reversed
without going through the formal negotiation process again. In theory, the World
Trade Organisation rules ensure non-discrimination and fair competition for all.
Both the developed and developing countries have an equal right to challenge
others in the World Trade Organisation’s dispute settlement procedure. The
members are also obliged not to act unilaterally, should disputes arise.
Enforceability
To enable the World Trade Organisation to be effective, the WTO has
established an institutional mechanism to enforce the international trade rules at
two levels: the multilateral trade level and the national trade policy level.
1) Multilateral Trade Level
The World Trade Organisation agreements are legally binding and enforceable.
Each agreement contains specific measures on market access, transparency, non-
discrimination, and MFN. For instance, GATT obliges the individual members to
make commitments to “bind” their tariff rates.
2) National Trade Policy Level.
The World Trade Organisation reviews national trade policies through an
institutionalised peer review system, namely the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM). The TPRM ensures the transparency and full compliance of national
trade policies. Under the TPRM, the largest four members namely the EU, the
US, Japan, and Canada, are subject to reviews each two years, while the rest are
reviewed each six years.
Dispute settlement.
For its ability to resolve disputes justly and deliver the results promptly, the World
Trade Organisation has set up its Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)
consisted of a set of clearly defined rules and procedures under which the
members have an equal right to challenge others in the World Trade Organisation,
should trade friction arise. Also, DSM contains a judiciary body named the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which has the sole responsibility to establish
tribunal panels, to monitor and implement rulings, and to authorise trade sanctions.
A settlement procedure typically lasts between twelve to fifteen months,
depending whether there is appeal.
At the completion of the panel procedure, the DSB would draft a final report,
which becomes the ruling. Both litigants can appeal the ruling. By rules, appeals
may not be made after 90 days. Under the DSM, any final ruling is automatically
adopted unless the entire membership reaches a consensus to reject it. Since
January 1, 1995, countries have brought more than 230 dispute cases before the
World Trade Organisation DSB.
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3.3.2 The Crisis in the World Trade Organisation
The inequity in the World Trade Organisation  
Despite the principle of equal rights and obligations of the World Trade
Organisation, some unequal practices have appeared which are complained about
by developing countries.
1) The unfair decision-making process under the principle of equity.
In this aspect, the main problem could be the conventional practice, namely the
Quad (namely the EU, the US, Japan, and Canada). Quad is usually formed
through an informal consultative process, in which only those four advanced
industrialised parties possessing sufficient human and institutional resources to deal
with the complex trade and legal agenda, are invited to participate. As the
decision-making process is not subject to consensus like that of the final
agreement, once in the Quad consensus is reached through interests swap
between those powerful industrial parties, and the Quad will possesses absolute
influence in the process of decision making. As critics point out, during the past
rounds of World Trade Organisation talks, almost all major issues relating to rule-
making or procedural amendments had been dominated by the Quad. Virtually,
developing countries are excluded from the rule-making process. In this context, it
is not surprising that the content of the produced rules tend to favor their makers,
the advanced industrial powers. For instance, during the Uruguay Round
negotiations, less than three percent of written proposals were submitted by the
sub-Saharan countries; however, all of the African members of the GATT must
accept the new obligations of the World Trade Organisation. Unfortunately, even
until the Seattle Conference, such practices were kept on by way of secret
meetings named the “greenroom process”.
However, within the framework of the World Trade Organisation, the developing
countries do not have adequate strength to counter the above unfair practice.
Because of the relatively small size of the Quad, it can circumvent the collective-
action problem more effectively than the developing countries. In contrast, the
developing countries suffer serious resource constraints, “most small delegations
do not have the appropriate resources in Geneva…to service the negotiating
process and thereby participate meaningfully in what could be meetings of primary
importance for their national interests”.
2) The unequal opportunity of attendance
According to the World Trade Organisation International Trade Statistics 2000,
in 1999, the developing countries enjoy 74 percent of World Trade Organisation
membership. However, the G729 powers account for 47.9 percent of world
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merchandise trade, and 49.8 percent of world trade in commercial services, and
they have more financial, technical, and human resources to support their
Missions in Geneva. As a result, in the late 1990s, only around 66 percent of
developing country members actually had a Mission in Geneva, while almost all
the developed counterparts enjoyed one. The average size of Mission for
developed countries was 6.8 persons, compared with 3.5 persons for developing
countries, not to mention the least developed countries’ average size, 1.2 persons.
Of the key institutions, representatives from the developed countries occupy
about 54.8 percent of all chief executive offices including chairmen and vice
chairmen in the General Council, Working Parties and Committees, Dispute
Settlement Body, and Trade Policy Review Body. By contrast, the developing
members have weaker negotiating power vis-à-vis the developed countries.
Further, their relatively large size creates serious collective-action and free-rider
problems for the developing camp as a whole, which renders it hard for them to
take a common position on major issues in the World Trade Organisation.
Penal system to effect legal sanctions
Although the Understanding successfully clarified that the World Trade
Organisation dispute settlement procedure can be invoked with respect to any
issue concerning Article XXIV, the DSB itself proves questionable.
1) Problematic efficiency
Between early 1995 and mid-2000, a total of 234 dispute cases had been
brought before the World Trade Organisation’s DSB but only 39 cases had been
successfully settled or withdrawn. Besides this poor record in settling disputes, the
World Trade Organisation DSM does not have the ability, as does the
Commission in the European Union, to pass a sentence on the violator of
international trade laws. Although in theory the DSB has the authority to issue
trade sanctions against any member failing to comply with the ruling, in reality this
has rarely been done.
2) The question of prejudice
Critics from the developing world point out that the DSM is prejudiced against
the developing countries. Among the 173 cases received between April 1994 and
March 1999, the Quad filed 110. Further, small members cannot rely on
retaliation against the large ones because raising import barriers will have little
impact on the latter. The banana trade dispute between Ecuador and the EU
exposed the very weakness of the World Trade Organisation dispute settlement
system. Ecuador had to rely on the US to file the case against the EU. The
relatively small size and the weakness of the Ecuadorian economy make it
impossible to bring retaliatory pressure on the EU. 30
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4 East Asia:strong willingness
followed by frequent activities
4.1 Interaction of exogenous  and endogenous
elements provides strong motives
The World Trade Organisation’s deficiencies and the possibility of inviting trade
creation instead of continuing to suffer trade diversion constitute general reasons
for the East Asian countries to conclude free trade agreements. These motives are
noticeably strengthened when they interact with he concrete situation in this
territory.
Painful lessons learned from the financial crisis
After suffering the financial crisis, at least three things about these countries were
recognised.
First, their economic system, especially their monetary system, proved severely
unhealthy and problematic. Second, none of them could successfully deal with the
crisis individually. Finally, further disappointment arose from the level of
international assistance. In this regard, it was clear that the Asian members
expected more than what they actually got. Now they feel they cannot rely on the
US to resolve a regional crisis because, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial
Crisis, the US left it to the IMF to deal with the crisis. But the latter vetoed
Japan’s proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund. At the same time, the
IMF imposed a stringent conditional loan package on the recipients. And in the
proposed emergency loan program for Thailand worth $17 billion, IMF provided
less than 25 percent with the rest promised by other countries in East Asia
including Japan. European and North American nations stood outside the
programme.
From then on, the Japanese Ministry of Finance realised that future currency
crises in any country in East Asia, which would be highly transmissible to others,
had to treated much more by countries in this territory than by the IMF- who are
not a benevolent fund. Sharing this view, as a tentative step, ASEAN, Japan,
South Korea, and Mainland China decided, in July 2000,to establish a Currency
Swap Agreement (CSA) as a pre-emptive safeguard against another regional
financial crisis.
Accession of Mainland China and Taiwan to the World Trade
Organisation
Both Mainland China and Taiwan were approved simultaneously last November.
This issue has led to at least two outcomes. First, Taiwan’s accession as an
individual customs territory renders it capable of participating in free trade areas
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covered by GATT XXIV, meaning it will have fairly extensive room to act.
Second, the accession of Mainland China results in both challenges and
opportunities in the area. Regarding the challenges, ASEAN alleged that its share
of total global FDI inflows declined from 7.9 percent in 1994 to 1.8 percent in
1999 because of investment flowing to China. And this percentage is likely to
grow further now China is in the World Trade Organisation.31 As for the
opportunities, the vast market of 1.7 billion people in Mainland China is
promising.
Views on the free trade area from Mainland China: from a negative
attitude to an active one
At an earlier stage, Mainland China was sceptical regarding both globalization and
regionalization. This attitude arose from its concern that globalization is
Americanisation or the promotion of American hegemony (economic, social and
political). As a result, national autonomy would be undermined. Of the regional
co-operation in this area, Mainland China kept on worrying about Japan’s leading
role and America’s intervention. In addition, the domestic economy of China still
needed a high degree of protection with regard to imports and inward flow of
investment.  The export markets were primarily United States and Europe and
there was therefore no urgent need to further open up the markets in the Asian
region through economic integration. Gradually, being aware of the inevitability of
globalization and the promising mutual benefits arising therefrom, Mainland China
started to work on entering the World Trade Organisation more than ten years
before.  After the Asian Financial Crisis, domestically, China’s stance toward
East Asian economic co-operation and integration also underwent significant
changes. Sharing the view of Japan that individual economies are very vulnerable
to external shocks, and acknowledging that the foreseeable capital inflow is so
important an issue of economic security, Mainland China is now a very active
advocate in fostering an East Asia free trade area. 32
Main actors’ fights for the hub rather than the spoke
As well as the impulse to counter the EU and NAFTA, themselves based on
alliance, the main actors namely ASEAN, Japan, Mainland China, Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore etc., also have individual interests. For one thing, they seek to
join more free trade areas in order to obtain more trade creation while avoiding
trade diversion.  For another thing, within a free trade area, they each pursue a
dominant position.
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4.2 Many activities
In the context of above motives, many things are happening in East Asia.
ASEAN, Japan, Mainland China, South Korea, Taiwan etc. are in the process of
establishing free trade areas or extending the existing FTAs.
4.2.1 Activities surrounding Asian Pacific Economic Co-
operation
Before the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation, there was a proposal for an
economic community due to the initiative of Premier Mahathir of Makaysia. He
proposed that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries and East
Asian nations such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan, should create an economic
community with more or less strong economic ties. But, it seemed that the United
States does not like any Asian integration that excludes it. By U.S. initiative, after
Japan’s suggestion (perhaps made because of its heavy dependence on the US),
the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) was created in 1989 as an
economic co-operation all over the Pacific Economic Basin. The parties of Asian
Pacific Economic Co-operation come from United States, Canada, Mexico, New
Zealand, Australia and all the Asian countries including Mainland China and
Taiwan.33
According to the United States, the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation can
still become a free trade area with binding norms, but for fear of the strength of
the US, this has been doubted by some of the Asian members. Furthermore, as
Mainland China felt angered by Taiwan’s accession to the Asian Pacific
Economic Co-operation, it did not support the US. Instead, it insisted that Asian
Pacific Economic Co-operation should just be a “forum” and confined to
economic issues. So the enforcement of consensus reached within the Asian
Pacific Economic Co-operation is dependent on peer pressure.
However, such peer pressure proved very weak. For instance, in early June
2001, Japan and China were engaged in a bilateral trade dispute over some low-
value Chinese agricultural imports. In April, Tokyo announced a decision to
impose import duties of 266 percent on shitake mushrooms and 106 percent on
rushes used to make tatami mats. Shortly after that, Mainland China threatened to
retaliate with 100 percent tariffs on imports of Japanese cars, mobile phones, and
air conditioners. Since Mainland China was not yet a World Trade Organisation
member, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Chinese President Jiang Zemin
have agreed to discuss the issue at the Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation
                                                
33 See supra  note 6.
33
summit meeting held in Shanghai in October 2001.  But no one could  see any
peer pressure at the time and ultimately, it was resolved depending on the
political will to settle34.
Considering the above situation, the main actors in this area seem to prefer to set
up or enter other free trade areas for closer co-operation and meanwhile,
compete the central position by concluding more free trade agreements than
others.
4.2.2 Activities surrounding  the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)
4.2.2.1 Background of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN)
Due to the increasing tensions among the states and overall uncertainty in the
Southeast Asia in 1960’s, there was a need to develop a regional forum to
alleviate pressures within the region and to promote economic growth between
countries.35 On August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations was established by five original member countries:
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. From 1984 to
1999, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia joined in. Now ASEAN
has become home to all ten Southeast Asian countries36.
ASEAN had three basic objectives: “to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to
reduce the regional influence of external actors, and to promote the
socioeconomic development of its member states as a further hedge against
Communist insurgency.”37 These ends have involved the support of the ASEAN
establishment, strengthening regional solidarity and self-reliance by emphasising
“economic, social, and cultural co-operation and development.”38  Gradually,
there develops what is known as the “ASEAN way” based on Malay cultural
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practices.39 Following the  “way”, all decisions “are made within ASEAN on the
basis of consensus,” 40 which in return led to the strong cohesion that now exists
between the ASEAN member states.
4.2.2.2 ASEAN Free Trade Area (ASEAN)
Seeing that the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement
in the 1990s had powerful effects on world trade patterns41, and concerned about
the rapid proliferation of free trade areas among important trading partners, the
leaders of ASEAN decided to make a similar move towards regional economic
integration.42
Having previously experienced failure in setting up a free trade area called
Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) signed on February 24, 197743, at the
Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, the Asian Free Trade Area
(AFTA) was launched. Because of the failure of the PTA, the ASEAN member
states introduced a more rigid instrument in the AFTA.  There was a strategic
objective to increase the ASEAN region’s competitive advantage as a collective
trading bloc. Under this came the proposal to eliminate tariff and non-tariff
barriers among the member countries which was expected to promote greater
economic efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. After that, the Agenda for
Greater Economic Integration was adopted at the Fifth ASEAN Summit held in
Bangkok, Thailand, in 1995.  This Agenda accelerated the timetable for the
AFTA from a fifteen year time frame to ten years-the projected conclusion date
was set for 2003.44 Furthermore, at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in 1998, the
process was further accelerated by setting a target date for the original ASEAN
members of 2002.
                                                
39 Shaun Narine, Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN, 161 World
Affairs 33 (1998).
40 See supra  note 38.
41 Ross Garnaut, ASEAN and the Regionalization and Globalization of World Trade, 14
ASEAN Econ. Bull. 215, 321 (Mar. 1998).
42 Carolina Alberto Lopez & Jacint Soler Matutes, Open Regionalism Versus Discriminatory
Trading Agreements: Institutional and Empirical Analysis, 14 ASEAN Econ. Bull. 253, 254
(Mar. 1998).
43 Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Recent Development: Flexible Free Trade: The
ASEAN Free Trade Area, 34 Harv. Int’l L.J. 224, 225 (1993) (stating that the “PTA’s flexible
provisions resulted in widespread abuse of exclusion lists that ultimately limited the PTA to
a rather comical free trade in snow plows and other Southeast Asian nonessentials”).
44 Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview.
http://www.asean.or.id/history/overview.htm (viewed March 30, 2002)
This “projected” date is only for the original six ASEAN members. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar,
and Cambodia will be phased in at later intervals.
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4.2.2.3 ASEAN Plus Three
While the ASEAN was in the process of having a free trade area between its
members, the idea of setting further free trade area involving both ASEAN and
other East Asian countries has also been pursued.
In December 1990, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed the
formation of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) which excluded the US in
order to reduce the region’s heavy dependence on US markets. Mahathir’s
proposal a received warm welcome from ASEAN and South Korea. However,
Mainland China, supported it conditionally, stating it was opposed to Taiwan and
Hong Kong joining initially. What was worse, the US did not wish to see a
“dividing line down the Pacific,” 45 therefore was strongly opposed to the idea of
the all-Asian club. Partially in consideration of the stance of US, Japan refused to
endorse the EAEG.
So the EAEG was downgraded to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in
1995. The EAEC, known as ASEAN Plus Three, which is composed of
ASEAN, Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea was subsumed under Asian
Pacific Economic Co-operation. Not satisfied with this result, and like Mainland
China, Malaysia’s Minister for International Trade and Industry Rafidah Aziz
declared that “anything that happens in Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation is
non binding, period.” The Philippines Under-Secretary for Trade and Industry
Edsel Custodio also responded: “Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation…should
be a loose consultative machinery, it should be non-binding, it should not be a
negotiating forum and it should not be institutionalised.”
4.2.2.4 Mainland China’s unilateral activity towards ASEAN
Although Mainland China has not yet entered into any formal free trade
agreements, it is contemplating establishing a strategic free trade area with
ASEAN. At the ASEAN Plus Three Summit Meeting held in Singapore in
September 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji called for the formation of an
“ASEAN-China free trade area” as a political and economic counterweight
against the European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement. In
November 6, Zhu and ASEAN reached an agreement to set up the “ASEAN-
China FTA”.
Up to March 28, 2001, there have been held three joint committees between the
two sides.46 These committees centered on the issues of establishing an ASEAN-
                                                
45  US Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord  (Atkinson 1995:
39).
46 http://www.aseansec.org/archive.html (viewed March 30, 2002).
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China Expert Group on Economic Co-operation to look into the implications of
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation and recommend measures on
how to further enhance ASEAN-China economic co-operation and integration,
including the possibility of establishing a free trade area between ASEAN and
China.
4.2.3 Other activities
4.2.3.1 Japan and Korea
Among the “three” countries of the ASEAN Plus Three, Mainland China was the
first one to propose concluding a free trade area with ASEAN. Surprisingly,
Japan then reasonably accelerated its activities. On January 13,2002, the
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age
Economic Partnership, (JSEPA) was signed. This approach was regarded as a
Japan’s “touch stone” 47 prior to deepening relations among the ASEAN Plus
Three.
In addition, Japan is also discussing with Korea regarding the establishment of a
free trade area. 48
4.2.3.2 Singapore
Singapore is making vigorous effort to secure a strategic hub position in Southeast
Asia. Before the agreement mentioned above, Singapore had signed a free trade
area with New Zealand (ANZSCEP) on November 14, 2000. Now, Singapore
is negotiating free trade areas with Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the
US.
4.2.3.3 Taiwan
Considering the alleged intervention of Mainland China, Taiwan has issued its
counter policy. It stated that “friendly countries are first to be considered”
concerning the establishment of free trade area. On 11 April, 2002, its leader
Chen Shuibian  proposed to set up a free trade area with the United States and
Japan.
                                                                                                                           
47 http://www.tier.org.tw/ (viewed April 11, 2002).
48 http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/NS/091/NS-C-091-090.htm(viewed April 07, 2002).
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5 Strong willingness v. reality
It is well known that a healthily operated free trade area, would, like EU and
NAFTA, foster the development of regional free trade leading to freer global
trade. However, mere strong willingness is far from adequate.  Examining the
factors behind the success of the European Common Market, and comparing
them with the present situation in East Asia may be helpful to the East Asia
countries in allowing them to assess the perspective of their planed regional
alliance in a more reasonable way.
5.1 The experiences of a successful EU
There are many reasons leading to the success of European Union. These reasons
should be strongly considered in planning an East Asia free trade area.
Political background
In the context of the post-Second World War period, Western Europe has
looked outward not inward for their future. Simultaneously, most nations begin to
share similar political systems: that is an essential basis allowing them to abandon
divergence and reach a compromise position. In addition, the need to counter
their Communist common enemy led to the formation of NATO which in turn
granted them necessary experience concerning the building of a union.49
Similarity and proximity
First, although the present member states and the candidates each possess their
own culture, many cultural similarities are to be found, deriving Christian, Roman
and Greek origins. The nations in this territory are characterised  by their western
outlook, have a common religious base and, in particular, enjoy a strong legal
tradition with a long history.
Second, being located together on a relatively small territory allows them to have
a natural and intense trade relationship.
Third, nations here are almost all well developed and industrialized and even the
less developed countries like Spain and Portugal still have a GNP/per capita
higher than most other states in the world.
                                                
49 Ken Day and Paul Herbig, Outgrowth of ASEAN, a Common Market of the Pacific:
lessons to be learned from the European experience, European Business Review Volume 95
· Number 2 · 1995 · 12–23.
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These similarities are regarded as a basis for ease of establishing and maintaining a
union. The fact that the EFTA countries have joined EU one after another is a
further convincing support for this view.
Boldly to remove trade barriers
It is admirable that the member states can almost always keep a very reasonable
attitude towards the relationship between the  national good  and the EU’s
competitive international position. Whenever conflict happens, the member states,
even if reluctant at first, will accept the Community interests by way of eliminating
any disputed tariff or similar measure.
5.2 Diversity in East Asia
Compared with the situation in the European Union, many countries in this area
have considerable diversity of ethnicity, religion, history, political system, and
economic mechanism.
Religion
The diversities can be well illustrated by focussing on religion. Protestant
Christianity is fairly influential in Korea. Catholicism is dominant in the Philippines.
Isalm is the main religion of Malaysia, and Indonesia has the largest Moslem
population in the world. In the other part of this region, Buddhism is influential.
Further, the ethic of Confucianism lies in the background in Mainland China as
well as in Taiwan.
Political system
In this area, it is noted that two polar types of political system still exist. Human
rights issues in one of them are subjects of criticism by developed nations. This
fact seriously prevents from building up mutual trust. Although some of them are
the Transitional Economies of Asia, it still seems difficult to establish cooperation
between the Transitional Economies and the market economies. The struggle
between Mainland China and Taiwan surrounding this central problem is an
obvious example.
History
Observing the history of East Asia, several of the countries or areas have
experienced colonialism. The Philippines have a history of Spanish and American
colonial influence; the South Asia Countries, Singapore, and Hong Kong were
under British colonial influence; and Korea and Taiwan were under Japanese
influence. In this context, it would be a rather complicated issue to reach
consensus among these countries to the extent that what is involved relates to the
interaction between local systems and relics of the colonial system.
Economy
40
It is remarkable that some countries are in transition from the socialist economy to
the market economy. Generally speaking, these transitional economies have been
doing well in average, and extremely well in some cases.  However, the degree of
openness of these countries varies. In external trade, Singapore and Hong Kong
are free ports, pursuing free trade system and have benefited from it. In contrast,
other economies still have some protectionistic elements.
5.3 Basis for cooperation
5.3.1 General Tendency among the countries of ASEAN
Plus Three
According to ASEAN statistics, trade volume between ASEAN and China,
Japan and Korea  grew by 27.5 percent from US $ 158.2 billion in 1999 to US $
201.7 billion in 2000. However, despite the positive economic growth and
optimism of the year 2000, there is a growing consensus that the trend would not
continue in view of the slow down in the US, EU and Japan. In this regard, the
economic ministers and the ministers of Mainland China, Japan and Korea
underlined their commitment to maintain outward looking policies to attract trade
and investment and bolster economic growth. Further, they stressed the
importance of continuing regional economic integration as a means of promoting
trade and investment flows. 50
5.3.2  Mainland China and ASEAN
5.3.2.1 Present situation
Value of Trade
There has been a steady rise in the relative share of ASEAN in China’s
merchandise trade–from 5.8 per cent in 1991 to 8.3 per cent in 2000.  ASEAN
has thus become the fifth largest trade partner of China (after Japan, the United
States, the European Union, and Hong Kong).  And this is an important trend: the
absolute value of China’s trade, for example, went up very significantly–from US$
135.8 billion in 1991 to as much as US$ 473.4 billion in 2000.
At the same time, China has also become an important trade partner of ASEAN,
occupying the sixth position in 2000.  The share of China in ASEAN’s trade
expanded from 2.3 per cent in 1991 to 5.0 per cent in 2000.  In absolute terms,
                                                
50 http://www.aseansec.org/archive.html (viewed March 20, 2002.)
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the total value of ASEAN’s export trade was US$ 343.8 billion in 1991 rising to
US$ 795.0 billion in 2000.
Structure of Trade
The composition of ASEAN-China trade has evolved considerably. Resource-
based commodities – especially hydrocarbon, wood, and fat and oil products –
accounted for two-thirds of the total export value of ASEAN to China in the early
1990s, but only 22 per cent in 1999.  The relative share of manufactured goods –
electrical machinery and computer equipment especially – went up from 12 to 38
per cent in the same periods.
Meanwhile, ASEAN imports from China have been comparatively more
diversified.  The top five imports 51 accounted for almost two-fifths of the total
import value in the early 1990s, and 57 per cent in 1999.
Trade in Services
Two-way services flows between ASEAN and China have also been on the
increase.  Tourism is a good case in point.  ASEAN tourists visiting China totalled
almost 1.1 million in 1995; the number reached an estimated 1.8 million in 2000.
Meanwhile, ASEAN received about 0.8 million tourists from China in 1995.
More remarkably, however, the number of Chinese tourists to ASEAN almost
tripled to 2.3 million persons in 2000.
The potential for two-way tourism is really inviting.  At present, ASEAN tourists
were less than 8 per cent of the total tourist arrivals (19.8 million) in China during
1999 while Chinese tourists in ASEAN made up just 10 per cent of the 22.6
million persons visiting ASEAN in 2000.
Investment Flows
Both ASEAN and China have invested considerable resources overseas.
Foreign direct investment made by China in other countries averaged US$ 2.1
billion per year during 1989-1994; it rose to US$ 2.2 billion a year over 1995-
2000.  Outward FDI from the old ASEAN-5 members (except Brunei
Darussalam) averaged US$ 3.7 billion a year during 1989-1994; it reached US$
7.0 billion in 2000.
China has been a destination for FDI from some ASEAN member countries-
directly or via Hong Kong.  Likewise, several ASEAN member countries have
also been the host to important FDI flows from China, both directly and via third
party ventures.
It is likely that the old ASEAN-5 (excluding Brunei Darussalam) collectively have
been a net investor in China.  In general, a large proportion of FDI is channelled
to resource-based and trade related activities. Manufacturing for the domestic
market is also another important sector for such investment.  In addition, there is
considerable FDI “in kind” – that is the investors supply manufacturing equipment
                                                
51  electrical machinery, computer equipment, hydrocarbon products, cotton and tobacco.
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and machinery as equity in the joint ventures with their local partners, who usually
provide land and infrastructure.
5.3.2.2 Future Cooperation
It is estimated that the industrialized countries in America and Europe will continue
to be the most important trade markets, sources of investment finance, and origins
of cutting-edge technologies for both ASEAN and China in the foreseeable
future.  But within this region, there are potential and opportunities – both
substantial and exciting – for greater and closer ASEAN-China complementarities
along their routes to further development.
Economic perspective
The Chinese economy is a huge one.  Gross domestic product (GDP) reached
US$ 1,080 billion in 2000.  In comparison, the combined GDPs of ASEAN
amounted to US$ 573.8 in the same year.  What is more, China has been the
fastest growing economy in the world for over a decade.  Even during the
economic crisis and slowdown of the late 1990s, GDP in China continued to
expand by between 7 to 9 per cent a year during 1997-2001.  On the other
hand, the GDPs of several ASEAN member countries contracted, some quite
severely, in 1997 and again slowed down significantly during this year.
World Trade Organization membership
China’s World Trade Organisation  membership is widely expected to have
several positive spill-over effects on ASEAN-China trade and investment
relationships in a wide range of areas and services.
Firstly, China has agreed to a very comprehensive package of market
liberalization measures, with five years to carry out its full commitments.  The
liberalization process is expected to enhance greatly China’s economic efficiency,
industrial modernization, and integration with the global economy.
In particular, various research studies indicate (a) higher levels of China’s share in
global exports and imports, by 2 percentage points by 2005; (b) higher levels of
export earnings (by 24 per cent) and import spending (by 18 per cent), and (c)
higher GDP growth by at least one percentage point (equivalent thus to over US$
10 billion on the basis of GDP in 2000).
Secondly, there will be greater market access for ASEAN producers in China.
Trade barriers on ASEAN exports, for example, will be reduced faster than the
average reduction – with tariffs on ASEAN products to be cut by 34 per cent (to
47 per cent) within five years.  It is estimated that, with its accession to the World
Trade Organisation, China’s demand for ASEAN imports will expand by 10 per
cent a year.  Thus, the value of such imports will reach US$ 35.5 billion in 2005,
compared to 22.2 billion in 2000.  However, the actual increase may even be
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larger, given the faster rate of increase of China’s imports of ASEAN products
relative to China’s imports from all sources.
Thirdly, there will also be greater market access to China among ASEAN
member countries.  The sectors facing greater competition from China include
textiles and clothing plus other labour-intensive manufactures. In addition, China is
expected to enjoy a competitive advantage in a wide range of other manufactures.
Generally, it appear that both ASEAN and China will have to manage-
effectively, and in a forward-looking manner, the many challenges brought by
trade liberalization as well as from their own competition in third-country markets.
The promotion and facilitation of cross-border co-operation, inter-firm
networking, and mutual dialogue are among the key requirements for the effective
management and mitigation of such challenges.  It is also essential to ensure
smoother integration over time.
Tariffs
Another important factor was the decision by the leaders of ASEAN and China
to look at ways and means to enhance economic co-operation and integration
specifically between ASEAN and China.  Among the possible options is the
possibility of setting up a free trade area between the two sides.  Their marketing
and purchasing power would be very much enlarged in a free trade area – to over
1.7 billion consumers with a combined GDP of almost US$ 1,665 billion and a
combined external trade value of US$ 1,269 billion as of 2000.
The removal of trade and investment barriers will certainly lower transaction
costs, raise economic efficiency, upgrade product quality, increase economies of
scale and scope etc.  All these will help improve external competitiveness in third-
market trade.  The (net) trade creation effects could be substantial, and so would
likely be the even bigger flows of trade-related investment.
It has been estimated that the ASEAN-China free trade area would raise
ASEAN’s exports to China by 48 per cent and China’s export to ASEAN, by
51 per cent.  At the same time, the combined GDP of ASEAN would expand by
at least US$ 5.4 billion while that of China, by some US$ 2.2 billion.
ASEAN’s experiences in free trade area
ASEAN members have gained much practical experience through the accelerated
implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and through such operational
schemes as ASEAN Industrial Co-operation (AICO) and ASEAN Investment
Area (AIA).  Further, AFTA is scheduled to be in force from 2010, instead of
2015 – with some extension for the newer ASEAN member countries.52
                                                
52 ASEAN and China – Partners in Competition,
http://www.aseansec.org/news/asean_china_partner.htm (viewed March 16, 2002).
44
5.3.2.3 Challenges
Negative elements between ASEAN and Mainland
Big challenges to liberalizing trade and investment relationships between ASEAN
and China exist. First, ASEAN countries may not be able to compete with
China’s vast pool of cheap, skilled and semi-skilled labour force. Second, the
countries of the ASEAN extensively fear concerning the potential for dumping
from Mainland China. Third, in the context of the other “two” countries, i.e. Japan
and Korea, there will surely be a fight for the “leadership” in ASEAN Plus Three.
The challenges to the regime of ASEAN
First, the present problems
Like most other regional associations in the world, ASEAN is a voluntary
association of sovereign states that do not yield their sovereignty to a central
authority. Although ASEAN  has its secretariat, it has never had supranational
authority or responsibility. Compared with the regime of the European Union, it
has no parliament, no court of justice, and no court of auditors. Nor has it a
common currency and central monetary authority. Moreover, it has no common
set of external tariffs or trade policies and regulations.
Second, the context of enlargement
It is well known that the issue of enlargement of the European Union encounters
many challenges, even though the EU enjoys admirable efficiency and almost fifty
years of experience. In addition, all the applicants are much weaker than the EU
as an entity or than may of the Member States.
In the context of enlargement, the ASEAN regime will be challenged much more
seriously. Because, for one thing, as mentioned above, its present regime itself
proves problematic and, for another, each of the Three countries has, individually,
the power to counter ASEAN, not to mention its single members. This situation
will pose a major problem to the regime of ASEAN.
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6 “China Free Trade Area”
6.1 Initiation of the free trade area53
Right after China’s application for World Trade Organisation membership was
accepted on 10 November 200154, Mr Tung Chee Hwa,  Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region(HKSAR), suggested setting up a free
trade area within the territory of Mainland China and Hong Kong. Later,
Mainland China confirmed that this proposal was welcome and was being
positively studied. Following that, Mr. Fulin Chi, the Dean of the China (Hainan)
Institute for Reform and Development Research proposed establishing the China
Free Trade Area where Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao will be
included.
6.2 Analysis on the  Triangle Relationship of
Mainland China Taiwan and Hong Kong 55
General approach
In the context of regional co-operation in this area, it was until now basically
driven by private initiative and market forces. Despite the absence of formal
intergovernmental agreements, each Government still provided independent
measures to facilitate such an integration. On external trade within the triangle
economies, Hong Kong has been used as a main enterpot for Mainland China's
booming export-oriented industries, and Taiwan has been increasingly depending
on Mainland China's economy in so far as concerns its trade balance in recent
years. Regarding foreign direct investment, about 60 percent of FDI utilised by
Mainland China was from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and Mainland China has
become Hong Kong's second most important source of FDI in recent years.
Mainland China did have some FDI in Taiwan mainly through Mainland China’s
                                                
53 A regional free trade agreement between Hong Kong and China, Concept Paper Hong
Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
http://www.chamber.org.hk/business_world.asp (viewed March 23, 2002).
54 China’s application for World Trade Organisation  membership was adopted at the World
Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference in Doha on 10 November 2001, and it formally
became a World Trade Organisation member on 11 December, 2001.
55 Wuu-Long Lin, Integrating the Triangle Economies of Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Mainland China -- Co-operation versus Competition. (October 21,1999).
http://depts.washington.edu/gttl/htdocs/bachman/linpaper.pdf.(viewed march 9, 2002).
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state owned enterprises registered in Hong Kong. Finally, both Taiwan and Hong
Kong have been gradually losing their international competitiveness as against
Mainland China and have seen a decrease in their imports’ market shares in the
United States and Japan. Taiwan is obliged to adopt a conservative and
precautionary approach to cross-strait economic relations with the aim of ensuring
that Taiwan's economic security can be protected. Such policy measures can
perhaps be revised once cross-strait relations can be conducted on the basis of
mutual respect and without hostility.
Taiwan Strait Relations
In order to solve technical problems arising from “indirect” trade and investments
as well as from the desirable cross-traits tourism, the two sides across the Strait
have independently adopted separate measures. Taiwan has set up an official
organisation, called Straits Exchange Foundation, while Mainland China has also
set up an official organisation, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits. Within the terms of references empowered by their respective
governments, officials from these two organisations meet periodically to exchange
their views and to tackle technical problems.
However, until now, there seems no sign that the two sides can go any further
politically.  It can be hoped that increased economic interrelations will also have a
positive effect on the situation.
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7 Conclusion
Reviewing the facts above, we can say that the proliferation of the free trade
areas in East Asia is natural. Examining the reasons behind it, the economic
dynamics and the shortcomings of the World Trade Organisation could be one
while the complicated  political elements within this area could be another. In this
regard, it seems there is a need to strengthen the governing of the regional trade
agreement within the framework of WTO. It would also help developing countries
to see a more reliable WTO regime.
As for Mainland China’s approach, i.e. the “ASEAN-China free trade area” and
the “China Free Trade Area”, it is difficult to foresee its future. The key problem,
of cause, is the different political system. This very fact continuously prevents
deeper co-operation. However, the fact of China’s entry into the World Trade
Organisation means the political factor is weakening.
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